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THE APOSTASY OF GEORGE ROCHBERG
Alan Gillmor
In the early 1960s, George Rochberg—then one of the leading fi gures of the 
post-Schoenbergian wing of modernism in America—began moving rapidly 
back to the future in his search for a musical language that would free him 
from what he increasingly began to see as the limited expressive range of seri-
alism. Interestingly, much of the original attraction of serialism for Rochberg 
was what he perceived to be its power to penetrate deeply into the realm of 
the unconscious, to reveal the darker side of the psyche, rather like a kind of 
sonic depth psychology. Now, however, he began to see the over-rationalized, 
systematized dissonance of the neo-Schoenbergians as emotionally restricted 
and one-dimensional, a kind of “musical esperanto,”1 incapable of expressing 
the larger dimensions of life. Th e result was a series of works—the most famous 
(or infamous perhaps) of these being the Th ird String Quartet (1971–2), which, 
by the composer’s own admission, draws “heavily on the melodic-harmonic 
language of the nineteenth century”2—that would provoke a stormy reaction 
among the composer’s peers. Clearly a collective nerve had been hit, for few 
American composers of Rochberg’s generation have generated such a violent 
reaction and response, both pro and con, but mostly—at least initially—the 
latter. Th e gloves, as it were, came off  as Rochberg was accused, either directly 
or by implication, of being a scurrilous traitor to the cause, a coward, a master 
forger and shameless pasticheur, a parasite, a skilful mimic, and—most lurid-
ly—a kind of cultural grave robber.3
In the fall of 1961, within days of completing his serial Second String Quar-
tet, Rochberg revealed something of his essentially “romantic” world view in a 
letter to the Canadian composer Istvan Anhalt, whom he had met earlier that 
year at an International Conference of Composers held in Stratford, Ontario.4 
1 Rochberg, liner note for the 1973 recording of the Th ird String Quartet (Nonesuch H-71283); 
reprinted in Joan DeVee Dixon, George Rochberg: A Bio-Bibliographic Guide to His Life and Works 
(Stuyvesant, NY: Pendragon, 1992), 139.
2 Rochberg, ibid., 141.
3 See, for example, Steven D. Block, “George Rochberg: Progressive or Master Forger?” Perspec-
tives of New Music 21, nos. 1–2 (Fall–Winter 1982 / Spring–Summer 1983): 407–9; Lance W. Brunner, 
“George Rochberg: “Th e Concord Quartets,” Notes 38, no. 2 (December 1981): 423–6; Andrew Porter, 
“Musical Events: Questions,” New Yorker, 12 February 1979, 109–15; and Hugh Wood, “Th oughts on a 
Modern Quartet,” Tempo 111 (December 1974): 23–6.
4 For a discussion of Rochberg’s and Anhalt’s diff erent responses to modernism, see Eagle 
Minds: Selected Correspondence of Istvan Anhalt and George Rochberg (1961–2005), ed. Alan M. Gill-
mor (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007), xiii–xxxvii. Portions of this essay fi rst ap-
peared in my introduction to this volume.
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Reacting to performances of music by Milton Babbitt, Elliott Carter, and Leon 
Kirchner that he had heard in New York on 6 September, he wrote:
I came away from the concert feeling one overpowering dissatisfaction: 
namely, the inability of any of the three composers to make a passionate 
statement, to produce vibrant music that catches you up & does not let 
go until it has said all it intends to. In short the burning intensity of a 
Beethoven or Mahler or the dark somber intensity of a Brahms or the bite 
of a Schoenberg or Varèse are not there because the engagement with life 
& reality which produces suff ering is not there. If music is merely the writ-
ing of the “pieces” I withdraw my criticism. But that is the least of what 
music is. I do not care if the technical aspects of Carter’s or Kirchner’s 
music, each in its own peculiar way, are more than competent, polished, 
sure. Rimsky-Korsakov was a damned good craft sman; so was Dvořák; 
also Telemann & a host of others. But they were not visionaries. Give me 
the awkwardness of Mussorgsky with its wild passion; or the occasionally 
clumsy ways of Charles Ives with its ability to overcome its own inad-
equacy. Music today is more than sounds and sound manipulations, at 
least for me. It is a way of reaching the ineff able or exorcising the Devil. It 
is duende, the black sounds of human blood as Garcia Lorca says. We have 
to dip ourselves back into life. We have to get behind the external façade 
of phenomena. Neither Babbitt, Carter nor Kirchner is capable of this & 
consequently their music ultimately remains stylistic eff ort which will be 
washed away with the next new wave whatever it may be. Schoenberg has 
no real value as far as I’m concerned merely as the basis of the 12-tone 
method. He means something because he speaks with the intensity & 
rasping tone of the prophet crying out in the wilderness. Even the gentler 
Webern has a kind of white heat, a concentration of condensation which 
cuts its way into the soul & enriches the heart. Well, never mind my raving 
& ranting. I simply can’t take my music calmly—objectively.5
Rochberg’s last strictly twelve-tone work was the First Piano Trio (1962–3). In 
the summer of 1963, during the fi nal stages of its composition, he seemed to 
know that he had reached an impasse for, in a letter of 1 July of that year, he 
confi ded in Anhalt:
I know that this is the last piece I will write in this particular way. I want 
to get on to do something else that is brewing, i.e., a diff erent point of view, 
a diff erent angle of approach. How tired I’m getting of complex surfaces. I 
5 George Rochberg to Istvan Anhalt, letter of 9 September 1961, in Gillmor, Eagle Minds, 5–6. 
Th e works in question were Babbitt’s Vision and Prayer (1961), Carter’s Double Concerto for 
Harpsichord, Piano and Two Chamber Orchestras (1961), and Kirchner’s Concerto for Violin, Violon-
cello, Ten Winds, and Percussion (1960). 
Duende literally means “imp,” “goblin,” or “demon”; for Lorca, duende is the “mysterious power” 
of great art: “‘All that has dark sounds has duende.’ And there is no greater truth. Th ese dark sounds 
are the mystery, the roots pushing into the soil which we all know, which we all ignore, but from 
which comes what is real in art . . . Angel and muse come from outside; the angel gives light and the 
muse gives shape . . . Th e duende, though, must be awakened in the deepest dwellings of blood.” From 
the text of a lecture the poet gave in Havana and Buenos Aires in 1933, “Th eory and Function of the 
Duende,” in Federico Garcia Lorca, Selected Poems, trans. Merryn Williams (Newcastle upon Tyne: 
Bloodaxe Books, 1992), 219–30.
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long for the ability to make simple, direct statements & bury the complex-
ities below the surface where only I will know they exist or perhaps a few 
sympathetic souls will care to burrow for nuggets, if any exist, that is!6
It is evident, however, that Rochberg’s disillusionment with serialism—in par-
ticular, total (or integral) serialism—had been incubating for several years be-
fore that. As early as 1957, in a review of Pierre Boulez’s two-piano work Struc-
tures (Book 1), he touched on a theme that would haunt many of his later public 
(and private) statements: he charged the French composer with disregarding 
the non-rational side of the human spirit, with substituting a “remarkable cere-
bration” for “a deeply felt creative necessity.”7 Fift een years later, Boulez would 
become the target of one of Rochberg’s most celebrated aphorisms: “Th e past 
refuses to be erased. Unlike Boulez, I will not praise amnesia.”8
In a 1959 essay Rochberg argued that a completely rationalized system of 
composition (“total organization”) is incapable of mirroring subjective ex-
perience, for it tends to divorce the composer from the composition while 
impairing the equilibrium between musical structure and its perception.9 He 
refi ned the argument in 1960, in one of the fi rst essays to explore his longstand-
ing fascination with the concepts of time and space in music—the relationship 
between duration and existence and the roles of memory, identity, intuition, 
and perception in the shaping of human experience.10 Commenting on the 
two dominant approaches to high-culture music in the fi rst two decades of 
the post-1945 era, Rochberg identifi ed a problem common to both. Although 
seemingly polar opposites in their approaches to the organization (or non-
organization) of sound, both total serialism and chance music, in Rochberg’s 
view, are inherently incapable of projecting the three-dimensionality of time 
perception—past, present, and future—in artistically meaningful ways. For 
Rochberg, serialism was chiefl y a syntax, not a language.11
Certain limitations in modern music—chance music or its putative opposite, 
serialism—have emerged over the intervening years since its heyday. Chance 
music, associated in particular with John Cage and his disciples, seems content 
6 Rochberg to Anhalt, letter of 1 July 1963, in Gillmor, Eagle Minds, 22. 
7 Rochberg, “Pierre Boulez: Structures,” Notes 14, no. 2 (March 1957): 197. It is interesting to 
note that Boulez would write, some thirty years aft er the composition of Structures, that great art was 
“a mixture of the rational and the irrational; the two are like a knot that is impossible to untie.” “Th e 
Composer and Creativity,” Journal of the Arnold Schoenberg Institute 11, no. 2 (November 1988): 122.
8 Rochberg, “Refl ections on the Renewal of Music,” Current Musicology 13 (1972): 76; reprinted 
in Rochberg, Th e Aesthetics of Survival: A Composer’s View of Twentieth-Century Music, ed. with intro. 
by William Bolcom (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1984), 233. As a kind of corollary to 
Rochberg’s aphorism, we might add the following statement by neuroscientist Daniel Levitin: “Mem-
ory aff ects the music-listening experience so profoundly that it would not be hyperbole to say that 
without memory there would be no music.” Daniel J. Levitin, Th is Is Your Brain on Music: Th e Science 
of a Human Obsession (New York: Dutton, 2006), 162–3.
9 See Rochberg, “Indeterminacy in the New Music,” Score 26 (January 1960): 9–19; reprinted in 
Rochberg, Aesthetics of Survival, 3–15.
10 See Rochberg, “Duration in Music,” in Th e Modern Composer and His World, ed. John Beck-
with and Udo Kasemets (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), 56–64; reprinted in Rochberg, 
Aesthetics of Survival, 71–7.
11 Ibid.
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to accept a continuous Zen-like present as suffi  cient in itself, to which might be 
added Stanley Cavell’s observation that “speaking through chance foregoes a 
voice altogether—there is nothing to say.”12 Total serialism, on the other hand, 
by objectifying duration, is similarly restricted by allowing its form-giving 
properties to be compromised. In short, it fails to provide an organic three-
dimensional model of duration as experienced through the human perception 
of time: past (memory) and future (anticipation) become confl ated into a con-
tinuous present, and the crucial balance between information and redundancy 
has malfunctioned. (Could this be one of the reasons why many listeners re-
port a strong family resemblance between total serialism and chance music?) 
A homogeneity of dissonant texture results in a kind of harmonic stasis or en-
tropy. When temporality is compromised, the perception of musical form is 
subverted, replaced by a continuous circle of illusory space, of fl ux and eternal 
becoming.
As Rochberg observed, such space-form music “no longer exists in its for-
mer state of anticipation of the future. It projects itself as a series of present 
moments, holding up to aural perception each spatial image as the self-suffi  -
cient object of perception as it occurs, not as it will realize itself in some future 
event.”13 And further, “Th e suprarationalism of total serial music defeats the 
durational process in the end; that is to say, it does not engage the listener in his 
most profound intuitive relation to life and experience, through his grasp of 
duration by means of which he creates and recreates the order of his personal 
identity and therein fi nds his being.”14 Rochberg found reinforcement for his 
position in the writings of the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss, who argues 
that serialism is a “secondary” language, severed from its intuitive roots; it 
attempts “to construct a system of signs on a single level of articulation” by 
subverting those “general structures whose universality allows the encoding 
and decoding of individual messages.”15 Th at is to say, if culture is a system of 
symbolic communication, meaning is impaired when signifi ers are not rooted 
in general structures that defi ne tradition and create fundamental conditions 
of communication. Following from this, Lévi-Strauss formulates his critique of 
serialism by relying on a poetic marine metaphor, one that will resonate with 
the vast majority who, fi guratively, feel at sea in the presence of much serial 
music:
Only ideologically can the [serial] system be compared to a language, 
since unlike articulate speech, which is inseparable from its physiological 
or even physical foundation, it is a system adrift , aft er cutting the cables 
by which it was attached. It is like a sailless ship, driven out to sea by its 
captain, who has grown tired of its being used only as a pontoon, and who 
12 Stanley Cavell, “Music Discomposed,” in Art, Mind, and Religion: Proceedings of the 1965 
Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy, ed. W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill (Pittsburgh: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1967), 88–9.
13 Rochberg, “Th e Concepts of Musical Time and Space,” in Aesthetics of Survival, 132.
14 Rochberg, “Duration in Music,” 67.
15 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Th e Raw and the Cooked: Introduction to a Science of Mythology I, trans. 
John and Doreen Weightman (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 24.
Intersections29-1.indd 35   12/09/09 2:07:28 PM    
36 Intersections
is privately convinced that by subjecting life aboard to the rules of an elab-
orate protocol, he will prevent the crew from thinking nostalgically either 
of their home port or of their ultimate destination.16
In an article fi rst published in 1973, Rochberg recorded his reaction to Lévi-
Strauss, concluding that his “formulation, while not historical, points up the 
real consequences of Schoenberg’s act of wrenching himself loose from, but not 
free of, that general structure which defi nes tradition—that slow, invisible pro-
cess of accretion through which ‘real but unconscious relations’ work their way 
up and through generations of human beings.”17 Put another way, the mind 
is not a tabula rasa (as psycholinguist and social activist Noam Chomsky re-
minds us);18 there must be a shared fi eld of experience between the composer 
and the listener at some level of cognition if meaningful communication is to 
take place. Many years later Rochberg related in a letter to Anhalt:
Th e closest to a possibly convincing analogy between so-called science & 
music occurs in the preface or introduction to Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Th e 
Raw and the Cooked where he argues that a “secondary” language cut off  
from intuitive roots is an arbitrary thing, has no hope of survival, is not 
suffi  ciently anchored in the reality of the mysteries of the neurological 
makeup of man to secure it to ongoing cultural values . . . 12-tone or what 
everyone loves to call it, serialism, is a “secondary” language. True believ-
ers notwithstanding, ordered chromaticism plus any extensions into the 
genuinely unmeasurable such as texture, timbre, dynamics (ppp-ff f), even 
metrics which involves speed designations (fast: how fast is fast? slow: how 
slow is slow?)—that’s what I mean by unmeasurable—hit the rocks & reefs 
of an uncontrollable energy called “the sea” a long time ago.19 (emphases 
in original)
As a corollary to Lévi-Strauss’s position—clearly shared by Rochberg—it 
might be helpful to add Rose Rosengard Subnotnik’s observation concerning 
16 Ibid., 25.
17 Rochberg, “Refl ections on Schoenberg,” Perspectives of New Music 11, no. 2 (Spring–Summer 
1973): 77; reprinted in Rochberg, Aesthetics of Survival, 63.
18 See, for example, Chomsky, Syntactic Structures (Th e Hague: Mouton, 1965).
19 Rochberg to Anhalt, letter of 30 April 2000, Istvan Anhalt Fonds (MUS 164), Music Di-
vision, Library and Archives Canada, Ottawa. Th e extensive correspondence between Rochberg and 
Anhalt—nearly four hundred letters written between 1961 and 2005—are divided mainly between 
Library and Archives Canada and the George Rochberg Collection of the Paul Sacher Foundation in 
Basel, Switzerland. A selection of 252 of these letters appears in Gillmor, Eagle Minds. 
It should be noted that Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist approach to the problem of serialism has its 
critics. Morag Grant, for example, questions his assumption that musical and spoken languages func-
tion analogously on primary and secondary levels of articulation. In her view, such a binary system 
of communication fails to take into account the distinctions between open (serial) and closed (the-
matic) musical systems as well as aesthetic and semantic modes of information. Moreover, by insisting 
upon “the articulatory power of hierarchies,” Grant suggests, Lévi-Strauss risks placing himself in 
the unenviable position of rejecting not only serial music (with all its unlovely connotations in the 
popular mind) but also a great deal of music that belongs to a parallel stream of early modernism: 
Debussy’s more athematic, tonally ambiguous, and formally amorphous piano Préludes, for example. 
M. J. Grant, Serial Music, Serial Aesthetics: Compositional Th eory in Post-War Europe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), 212–3.
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the social failure of a great deal of modernist music, that the musical sig-
nifi cance of much contemporary high-culture music is located literally and 
exclusively in the individualized and oft en cryptic structure of the work, “to 
the point where it is protected against even the simple social activity of com-
prehending”; and she traces this attitude back to Schoenberg, for whom “‘the 
idea,’ as prior to sound and style, generates and indeed is ‘the totality of a 
piece’”20 (emphases in original). Indeed, as random encounters with such 
academic journals as Perspectives of New Music and Journal of Music Th eory 
reveal, more oft en than not, the new music is not to be judged qualitatively 
by its sound—a subjective surface appeal that resists “objective” analysis—
but rather quantitatively on the basis of its numerical and graphic substruc-
ture: the triumph of the eye over the ear or, in Ivesian terms, “manner” over 
“substance.”21 Is it any wonder that many critics have tended to mistake the 
system for the product?
Die-hard serialists are quick to point out that serialism is a technique, not 
a musical language, and therefore lends itself to the same stylistic range as 
tonal music. And this is essentially true. One can point to the dramatically 
diff erent sound worlds of the major founding troika—Schoenberg, Berg, and 
Webern—as evidence. However, these three composers do have one thing in 
common: their music, for a wide spectrum of the listening public, tends to 
be disorienting and alienating. Coming into being in a post-Freudian “age of 
anxiety,” atonalism and its serialist off spring became powerful expressive tools 
in an “expressionist” era intent on exploring the darker regions of the human 
psyche. In such enduring icons of modernism as Erwartung and Survivor from 
Warsaw, there is a perfect fusion of idiom and extra-musical content; one is 
hard-pressed to imagine such dark and disturbing emotions expressed in any 
other manner. Atonality, whether serialized or not, breathed from the outset 
the “air of another planet” and provided composers with the means to express 
the hitherto inexpressible.
Umberto Eco makes one of the most eloquent arguments for the necessity of 
new musical languages, in this case serialism, by making a distinction between 
“structural thought” and “serial thought”: 
Th e main goal of serial thought is to allow codes to evolve historically and 
to discover new ones, rather than to trace them back to the original gen-
erative Code (the Structure). Th us, serial thought aims at the production 
of history and not at the rediscovery, beneath history, of the atemporal 
abscissae of all possible communication. In other words, the aim of struc-
tural thought is to discover, whereas that of serial thought is to produce.22 
(emphases in original)
20 Rose Rosengard Subotnik, “Th e Challenge of Contemporary Music,” in Developing Varia-
tions (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 270–1, 275. 
21 See Charles Ives, Essays before a Sonata, the Majority, and Other Writings, ed. Howard Boat-
wright (New York: Norton, 1962), esp. 75–7.
22 Umberto Eco, Th e Open Work, trans. Anna Cancogni, intro. David Robey (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), 220–1. Th ere is, of course, an extensive literature, both pro and con, 
on the viability of serialism. On the negative side of the ledger, William Th omson requires an entire 
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Such a statement strongly indicates a  rejection of Lévi-Strauss’s structuralist 
thought, his notion of a double articulation of linguistic systems, which im-
plies that there are universal underlying principles in operation. Rather, Eco 
fi nds that the very strength of serialism is its capacity to generate new forms 
of communication, new structural realities. However, even if Rochberg had 
known the work of Eco—and there is no evidence of this—one can speculate 
that Eco’s arguments would not have swayed him, largely on the grounds that 
they do not address the layered roles of memory, continuity, and tradition in 
the construction of meaning.
Rochberg’s rejection of modernism, in particular that sub-creed of modern-
ism known as serialism, resulted in a veritable fl ood of critical commentary. At 
their most vigorous, these critiques move perilously close to the ad hominem, 
as in the vitriolic exchange between Jonathan Kramer and Rochberg that took 
place in the pages of Critical Inquiry in 1984–5. In December 1984, Rochberg 
published an article titled “Can the Arts Survive Modernism?” to which Kram-
er fi red back with “Can Modernism Survive George Rochberg?” Rochberg re-
sponded in the March 1985 issue with his “Critical Response: Kramer versus 
Kramer,” an obvious reference to the eponymous 1979 fi lm starring Dustin 
Hoff man and Meryl Streep, a gritty drama of child custody that won the Oscar 
for Best Picture that year.23 Th is is not the proper place to reopen the “modern-
ist/postmodernist” debate as it relates to music, which was generated—at least 
in America—to a great extent by Rochberg’s music and writings. But a brief 
overview of the exchange between Kramer and Rochberg will provide a useful 
summary of some of the key issues.
Although the notoriously slippery term postmodernism oft en appears in ref-
erence to Rochberg’s post-serial music, it should be noted that the composer 
rejected the validity of the label. As he wrote to Anhalt, it is “a term I have 
no personal use for!”24 For Rochberg, a term that incorporates modernism 
is objectionable on semantic grounds, if only because it would keep alive the 
memory of a discredited artistic movement and serve as “a constant reminder 
of the sickness of spirit which the modern movement engendered, of the loss of 
values it brought on, of the imbalances it caused.”25 Th e search for a more bal-
monograph to defend his bluntly stated thesis: “Whatever posterity may determine to have been the 
merit of his [Schoenberg’s] innovations as a composer, the rationale he devised for his music was 
derived from untenable hypotheses.” Schoenberg’s Error (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1991), 37. No less a champion of Schoenberg than Glenn Gould declared in a 1963 lecture at 
the  College-Conservatory of Music of the University of Cincinnati that the “fundamental eff ect” of 
Schoenberg’s soundworld “has been to separate audience and composer. One doesn’t like to admit 
this, but it is true nonetheless.” Glenn Gould, Arnold Schoenberg: A Perspective, foreword Arthur 
Darack (Cincinnati: University of Cincinnati Press, 1964), 17; reprinted in Th e Glenn Gould Reader, ed. 
with intro. by Tim Page (New York: Knopf, 1984), 119.
23 Rochberg, “Can the Arts Survive Modernism? (A Discussion of the Characteristics, His-
tory, and Legacy of Modernism),” Critical Inquiry 11 (December 1984): 317–40; Jonathan D. Kramer, 
“Can Modernism Survive George Rochberg?” Critical Inquiry 11 (December 1984): 341–54; Rochberg, 
“Critical Response: Kramer vs. Kramer,” Critical Inquiry 11 (March 1985): 509–17.
24 Rochberg to Anhalt, letter of 20 May 1984, in Gillmor, Eagle Minds, 141.
25 Rochberg, “Can the Arts Survive Modernism?” 332.
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anced culture requires a solution more profound than the scattered pluralism 
and relativism off ered by the postmodernists.26
Rochberg’s objections aside, it is indeed regrettable that such an oxymoronic 
and polysemous term has become fi rmly entrenched in the discourse of critical 
theory. As David Harvey notes, the term is “a mine-fi eld of confl icting notions” 
and should have disappeared “under the weight of its own incoherence.”27 To 
be sure, all attempts at labelling complex cultural movements are fraught with 
diffi  culties, but postmodernism seems to occupy a special niche in the lexicon 
as one of the most elusive and imprecise of terms. It will be understood in this 
context in the general sense of a sociocultural attitude rather than in the nar-
rower sense of a specifi c artistic trend or style. Just as Gertrude Stein referred 
memorably to the First World War as the fi rst cubist war,28 one could suggest 
that a “postmodern consciousness” is a chronic condition in the global village, 
a kind of cubist vision writ large of a technology-saturated world in which we 
attempt to negotiate a path through a multiplicity of polarities—fragmentation 
and homogeneity, eclecticism and innovation, unity and disunity, continu-
ity and simultaneity, local community and globalization, order and freedom, 
faith and reason, high culture and low—a jangle of sounds and images fl ood-
ing cyberspace, not to speak of urban space, in an unrelenting bombardment 
of the senses, a world in which mass advertising has become the capitalist art 
form par excellence. Little wonder that a single label should be incapable of 
encapsulating such a fractured and disoriented society as ours, a “moronic in-
ferno,” in Saul Bellow’s tragi-comic metaphor,29 an endless carnival of crass-
ness and banality that induces cultural amnesia. Postmodernism, in this sense, 
can perhaps best be seen as a symptom of a technocratic society, of cultural 
pathology, a pessimistic expression of a generation’s sense of uncertainty and 
foreboding. In the end, however, perhaps it is best simply to surrender and 
agree with Alex Ross that “‘modernism’ is already so equivocal a term that to 
affi  x a ‘post’ pushes it over the edge into meaninglessness.”30
26 For an extended discussion of Rochberg and postmodernism, see James Wierzbicki, “Refl ec-
tions on Rochberg and ‘Postmodernism,’” Perspectives of New Music 45, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 108–32.
27 David Harvey, Th e Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural 
Change (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990), viii.
28 See Gertrude Stein, Picasso (1938; repr. Boston: Beacon, 1959), 11.
29 See, for example, Humboldt’s Gift  (1975). Bellow borrowed the expression from the British 
painter, novelist, and critic Wyndham Lewis (1882–1957), for whom it was a symbol of a confused, 
decadent, and apathetic postwar Western European society—a vulgar mass of dead minds, of som-
nambulist automata, a “moronic inferno of insipidity and decay.” Rude Assignment: A Narrative of My 
Career Up-to-Date (London: Hutchinson, 1950), 169. It thus off ered Bellow an appropriate and vivid 
metaphor for what he perceived to be the corruption, dehumanization, and shallowness of contem-
porary American society. As Martin Amis reminds us, however, “Th e moronic inferno is not a pecu-
liarly American condition. It is global and perhaps eternal. It is also, of course, primarily a metaphor, 
a metaphor for human infamy: mass, gross, ever-distracting human infamy . . . It exactly describes 
a possible future, one in which the moronic inferno will cease to be a metaphor and will become a 
reality: the only reality.” Th e Moronic Inferno and Other Visits to America (New York: Viking Penguin, 
1987), x–xi.
30 Alex Ross, Th e Rest Is Noise: Listening to the Twentieth Century (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2007), 215.
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Rochberg’s analysis of modernism, in his opening salvo for Critical Inquiry, 
ranges far beyond music itself, which he sees as only a part of a variegated 
pattern of cultural thinking that permeated nearly every corner of twentieth-
century life. Central to his argument is what he called the “metaphysical gap,” 
deriving in large part from Wittgenstein’s proposition that ethical and aesthet-
ic judgments (one and the same thing for the Austrian philosopher) lie outside 
the property of language, that those questions of value that matter most in 
human life are immune to the descriptive powers of language, are beyond the 
limits of the “sayable.” Any discussion of values, therefore, must be consigned 
to the realm of “nonsense,” albeit important nonsense. Better yet, Wittgen-
stein famously admonished, “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be 
silent.”31 Art, however, need not be silent, for it is the bridge between language 
and silence and it embodies its own intrinsic value. Rochberg recognized that 
the “metaphysical gap between human consciousness and cosmos” is as old 
as recorded history and saw it as “the primary source and cause of human 
uncertainty,”32 a void that traditionally has been fi lled by art. By attempting to 
deny memory, history, and tradition, modernism succeeded in negating previ-
ous attempts to bridge the gap, leaving in its wake a deeper gulf than ever be-
fore. But we persist in reaching across the divide in our attempts to rediscover 
the true nature of things—as opposed to mere technological devices—in short, 
to reconnect with “the continuity of civilization and its enduring values.”33
Rochberg outlined three stages in the evolution of modernism: an Age of 
Gold and Silver (roughly 1900–14), a Bronze Age (1918–39), and an Iron Age 
(1945–ca. 1970). Th e last he saw as largely an American phenomenon, fuelled by 
the universities, which, especially aft er the Second World War, embraced art-
ists of all kinds, native-born and émigré alike, in record numbers. Academia 
became a necessary refuge for the dreamers in a highly utilitarian society that 
has from the beginning tended to view art—as opposed to entertainment—as 
non-essential. Such insularity would signal the death knell of modernism, in 
Rochberg’s view, as the cloistered isolation of the “ivy” tower bred (and in-
bred) a pseudo-scientifi c art at the extreme end of the “high-art” spectrum, a 
rarefi ed and hermetic art increasingly divorced from the outside world and 
seemingly oblivious to “the hungers of the human spirit.”34 Ironically, many of 
those American composers who lived through the Iron Age largely independ-
ent of the academy have fl ooded back into a fairly broad public consciousness 
in a way that lingering, rusting Iron Age modernists can only envy, if indeed 
they actually care.
Clearly, Jonathan Kramer was one who did care, for it would appear that 
Roch berg’s essay hit a nerve. Kramer’s is an uneven piece of work, contra-
dictory in parts, off  topic in others. It is odd that a polemic purporting to be 
a critical response to another polemic should begin by denying the validity of 
31 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. Cecil K. Ogden and Frank P. 
Ramsey, intro. Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922), 189. 
32 Rochberg, “Can the Arts Survive Modernism?” 336–7.
33 Ibid., 320.
34 Ibid., 331.
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artists expressing themselves in prose on the grounds that art does not obey 
aesthetic dictates. If this is true, then Kramer has nothing to fear. But he con-
tradicts himself early on by claiming that “only trivial art slavishly obeys aes-
thetic decrees,”35 a derogatory remark that could be construed, judging from 
the context, as linking Rochberg the composer with the more tawdry products 
of Soviet Socialist Realism.36 Whereas Rochberg ranges widely across the his-
tory of ideas, Kramer insists on keeping music the focus of his arguments. He 
approaches the ad hominem in basing his critical response not so much on 
Roch berg’s arguments per se as on his music. Suggesting that Rochberg was 
never really a modernist because he came to serialism late, he implies, in a curi-
ous lapse of logic, that the older composer is therefore an untrustworthy critic 
of modernism, concluding that “neither Rochberg nor anyone else can legislate 
art . . . Art does what it does for deeper causes than polemicists’ rantings.”37
In his “Critical Response,” Rochberg took Kramer to task on several grounds: 
“the endemic disarray of his thought process,”38 his slipshod use of language, 
his inability (or refusal) to grasp the larger dimensions of Rochberg’s approach 
to a complex problem, and, fi nally, his unfortunate tendency to use Rochberg’s 
music as a kind of club with which to beat him. As if berating a muddled gradu-
ate student, he concluded:
I fi nd it odd in the extreme and not a little amusing that he [Kramer] 
interprets my critical view of modernism as some kind of personal threat 
to modernism itself and/or as a form of already imposed or imminently 
impending “legislation.” Perhaps he senses or possibly fears the truth of 
what I have said and, in trying to defend his own incoherent and ques-
tionable position, has resorted to unseemly and unpalatable tactics. His 
scatter-shot attempt at a response is a far more convincing indictment 
of the jumbled ideology of present-day modernism than any I could ever 
have devised.39
Privately, Rochberg confi ded to Anhalt that “the ‘controversy’ was engi-
neered by the editor of Critical Inquiry. I have no objection to that per se but the 
level of discussion to be worthwhile is not ‘high’ enough, my respondent, one 
Jonathan Kramer, having seen fi t to make his piece a personal attack on me.” In 
addition, he noted with a tone of sad resignation, “I’ve never really understood 
why academic ‘discussion’ gets so acrimonious.”40 Finally, on 23 April 1985, he 
35 Kramer, “Can Modernism Survive George Rochberg?” 342.
36 It would appear to be no mere coincidence that the modernist project, which highly prized 
experimentation and originality in its search for a singular underlying reality—essential components 
of capitalist notions of creative liberty, individualism, and entrepreneurship—reached the apex of 
institutional acceptance during the height of the Cold War. If there is indeed a link, there is a certain 
irony in the fact that the Soviet Union was not alone in aestheticizing politics, albeit with far less 
subtlety. See, for example, Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract Ex-
pressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1983).
37 Kramer, “Can Modernism Survive George Rochberg?” 353.
38 Rochberg, “Critical Response,” 509.
39 Ibid., 517.
40 Rochberg to Anhalt, letter of 15 January 1985, in Gillmor, Eagle Minds, 157.
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wrote to Anhalt, “Perhaps you’ve gotten hold of Kramer’s ‘reply’—which will 
make reading my response to him more meaningful—especially in ‘explaining’ 
the tone I adopt toward him. In point of fact if I were a modernist loyalist 
 myself he is the last person in the world I’d want defending what I believed in”41 
(emphases in original).
Now, nearly a quarter century later, it seems at least mildly ironical to note 
that Kramer, a professor of composition and theory mostly at Columbia Uni-
versity, toward the end of his creative life moved away from “a highly struc-
tured serial language” in an attempt in his later compositions “to reconcile 
a tendency toward musical calculation with the more intuitive side of his 
personality,”42 a statement that suggests, if not a wholesale rejection of “aca-
demic” modernism, at least a soft ening of attitude. And of course the past few 
decades have seen the coming-of-age of a generation of composers in North 
America (and elsewhere) of various stripes who have made signifi cant inroads 
in reclaiming audiences who had long rejected the role of victims of modernist 
arrogance, simply refusing to be manipulated, to engage in the dialectic. Aft er 
all, silence is a form of resistance. Would it be unseemly to suggest that musical 
modernism, at least in its most ratiocinative and dogmatic form, did not in fact 
survive George Rochberg? Of course, he is by no means alone, for a signifi cant 
number of composers of roughly his generation, both in North America and 
abroad, followed a very similar path.
Th e remainder of this essay appraises Rochberg’s engagement with modern-
ism and postmodernism and its controversies in the light of recent Rochberg 
criticism, the continuity to be observed throughout his work, and the perspec-
tive on modernism, serialism in particular, that a century’s distance aff ords. 
Th e modernist/postmodernist debate oft en becomes acrimonious, almost to 
the point of parody. Th e modernists tend to lump the postmodernists together 
as simplistic popularizers with an overweening adolescent need to be loved, 
who disguise a lack of real musical substance with repetitive rhythms, creamy 
homogenized textures, and overripe orchestration, while the postmodernists 
tend to see the older generation as insular and puritanical academicians tena-
ciously holding on to jaded techniques and principles as if complexity were 
a badge of honour and communication and social engagement distasteful if 
not downright sinful. Not one known for her temperate views, Susan Mc-
Clary paints a vivid picture: “We are back to the Fall of Rome with the barbar-
ians at the gates; we are encouraged to perceive the serious composer as an 
endangered species and to provide public subsidies underwriting music that 
most proudly announces itself as incomprehensible.”43 What we are seeing, of 
course, is in many respects yet another variation of the “generation gap.” Th e 
modernists make the mistake of assuming that anti-modernism equals anti-in-
tellectualism and that “accessibility” and “simplicity” are synonyms, while the 
postmodernists indulge in an even more grievous error by assuming—or so it 
41 Rochberg to Anhalt, letter of 23 April 1985, in Gillmor, Eagle Minds, 163.
42 Th e New Grove Dictionary of American Music, s.v. “Kramer, Jonathan D” (by James Chute).
43 Susan McClary, “Terminal Prestige: Th e Case of Avant-Garde Music Composition,” Cultural 
Critique 12 (Spring 1989): 63.
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seems—that the validity of the new discourse automatically invalidates the old. 
Implicit in much of the debate is the modernist assumption that postmodern-
ism is restricted mainly to some form of minimalism, and that  minimalism 
itself is little more than a form of Muzak writ large. On the other side, the 
postmodernists drag out the same handful of victims for scorn—Babbitt and 
Boulez are favourite targets—as if modernism did not exist outside some form 
of total serialism. If the modernists tend to isolate music as an autonomous, 
objective, and abstract art in order to protect it from “cultural populism and 
passing fashion,”44 the postmodernists, in their zeal to connect music to socio-
political agendas, tend to transform the study of music into what Pieter van 
den Toorn has called “a kind of musicology of resentment”45 (emphasis in ori-
ginal). And so it goes. As Alex Ross reminds us, the debate between ars mod-
ernorum and ars antiqua is nothing new; it is centuries old. “Composition,” he 
concludes, “only gains power from failing to decide the eternal dispute. In a 
decentered culture, it has a chance to play a kind of godfather role, able to as-
similate anything new because it has assimilated everything in the past.”46
One of the most balanced critiques of Rochberg’s “postmodernism” comes 
from Richard Taruskin. By evoking the styles of the old “master narrative” 
through pastiche, he argues, Rochberg was doomed to produce merely simu-
lacra of emotions; that is to say, it is diffi  cult, if not impossible, to borrow a his-
torical style without also inheriting the emotional fi eld that is embedded in it. 
Whose “heartfelt emotions” are we experiencing? Can such music legitimately 
speak to or refl ect contemporary experience or is it nothing more than delu-
sional nostalgia? As Taruskin eloquently puts it (with a nod to Baudrillard):
Th e implication is indeed depressing: just as we can communicate artis-
tically only through the studied simulacra of styles that were once spon-
taneous, so our emotions themselves have become simulacra. Rochberg’s 
quest to regain the full range of sincere emotional expression that had been 
available to artists (and other humans) before the horrors of the twentieth 
century is thus doomed to failure: but the failure is noble, because it faces 
the unhappy truth of contemporary life rather than retreating, as mod-
ernism had done, into a self-satisfi ed, self-induced (and socially isolating) 
delusion of freedom. “Postmodernism,” in this view, means resignation to 
(or making the best of) a state of diminished capacity.47
As perceptive as Taruskin’s conclusions are, one wonders if he, like many be-
fore him, does not tend to rely too heavily on Rochberg’s early “collage” works, 
such as Music for the Magic Th eater (1965), or the more blatant “forgeries”—as 
some would claim—such as the third movement of the Th ird String Quartet 
44 Milton Babbitt, “Th e Unlikely Survival of Serious Music,” in Milton Babbitt: Words About 
Music, ed. Stephen Dembski and Joseph N. Straus (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987), 
163.
45 Pieter C. van den Toorn, Music, Politics, and the Academy (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995), 61.
46 Ross, Th e Rest Is Noise, 543.
47 Richard Taruskin, “Aft er Everything: Postmodernism: Rochberg, Crumb, Lerdahl, Schnitt-
ke,” Th e Oxford History of Western Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 5:435.
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(1971–2), works that fi gure prominently in almost every critique of the compos-
er’s music, including Taruskin’s. We need to remind ourselves that Rochberg’s 
“time of turning,”48 as he put it, was not centred on a wholesale repudiation of 
all forms of musical modernism but was aimed, more specifi cally, at the re-
pressive hegemony of serialism in the academy—especially in the northeastern 
United States where he was based—during the very period in the early 1960s 
when he began his rebellion. Moreover, it is arguable that Rochberg’s wholesale 
embracing of historical styles in the 1960s and 1970s was a necessary stage in 
his musical evolution—a kind of exorcism—as he strove to reinvent himself. 
Th at the composer himself clearly recognized the futility of continuing along 
this path we learn from a 1986 interview with the American conductor Richard 
Dufallo: “So it’s no longer a matter of speaking, or trying to speak the language 
of Beethoven . . . which I did in my Th ird Quartet. Some people absolutely de-
lighted in it and some absolutely abominated it, because I spoke directly in the 
language of the 19th century. I can’t do that anymore. When I did it, I believed 
it was possible. Now, I don’t believe in its effi  cacy any longer . . . in its rightness 
. . . and if I have that feeling, I must go on”49 (ellipses in original).
In this regard, it is instructive to compare the three piano trios (1962–3, 1985, 
1990).50 Th ose with an intimate knowledge of Rochberg’s music will recognize 
the composer’s voice in all three of these disparate works, which conveniently 
mark three distinct stages in his musical evolution. Th e fi rst is a twelve-tone 
piece that, while inhabiting the rather generic sound world of much serial com-
position of the period, is a work of nervous intensity and a kind of crystalline 
lyricism, a legacy, perhaps, of his association with Luigi Dallapiccola while on 
a Fulbright Fellowship in Rome in the early 1950s. Th e second is frankly tonal 
and grandly romantic in its gestures, therefore bordering on the very kind of 
pastiche that has tarnished Rochberg’s reputation in some quarters. Th e fi nal 
trio is, in a very real sense, a kind of masterly synthesis of the two styles and 
transcends them both. It is, in this writer’s estimation, by far the fi nest of the 
three, a work that manages to speak unselfconsciously and with a craggy lyri-
cism and emotional intensity very much its own. Th e composer also preferred 
the third trio; considering the three pieces as a group, however, he also took 
pleasure in their “linguistic and emotional diff erences. Th ey ‘bounce’ off  each 
other even while confi rming the same personality or voice expressed in widely 
diff erent gestures and ‘tones of voice’”51 (emphasis in original). It is interesting 
to note that Istvan Anhalt also sensed the superiority of Rochberg’s fi nal piano 
trio, and his response to his friend’s music is worth noting:
Very strong music this, George, and it would need thousands of words to 
describe the thoughts & feelings which it inspired. I said “strong,” and 
48 Rochberg, liner note for the 1973 recording of the Th ird String Quartet (Nonesuch H-71283); 
reprinted in Dixon, George Rochberg, 141.
49 Rochberg, quoted in Richard Dufallo, Trackings: Composers Speak with Richard Dufallo (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 72.
50 Th e Kapell Trio, Rochberg: Th e Th ree Piano Trios, Gasparo Records (Gasparo GSCD-289) 
(1998).
51 Rochberg to the author, letter of 2 November 1998.
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now I add: beautiful, moving, persuasive, wonderfully fl uent in language 
and more. Perhaps the last work (1990) represents the “peak” for me; the 
language is “integrated,” almost a Rochbergian “vernacular,” so personal 
is it. “Style” no longer is in question; there is a convincing discourse. Th e 
articulation of the movements, character, lengths, etc. are all “in one piece” 
here. Of course, the “burden” is in the minute details: the “natural fl ow” of 
counterpoint, the trouvailles of the harmonic colour & fl ow, the generos-
ity of silence (here) and the “stilling” of the dynamic from the rhetorical ff  
to the whisper-like pp. All in all: very persuasive piece the 1990 Trio.52
If many of Rochberg’s early post-serial works, with their elements of pastiche 
and collage, playfulness, irony, and a kind of schizoid heterogeneity (whether 
intended or not), can be seen to fi t some generally accepted defi  nitions of post-
modernism, the later works—of which the Piano Trio No. 3 is an excellent 
example—seem to inhabit a world apart from postmodernism. In any event, 
there are signs that we may be moving beyond it. Perhaps a future generation 
of historians will look back on postmodernism as a rather brief rococo-like 
transition period. Even though there may no longer be a single truth, with all 
the repression that potentially fl ows from such an Enlightenment utopian ideal, 
we still have to make choices, and we do not do this arbitrarily. Although we 
may have slain the notion of the meta-narrative, the postmodernist project 
nevertheless provokes the question: whose pluralism?
In a 1995 essay I argued that atonality, whether free or serialized, is a lan-
guage of instability, and therefore, in psychological terms, of abnormality, and 
that as such it is most eff ective when used in conjunction with other gestures, 
such as tonal stability, to suggest contrasting mental states.53 Passages from 
two iconic twentieth-century dramatic works might be cited as compelling 
evidence. In act 3 of Wozzeck, Berg reveals his deep empathy with his pathetic 
Kafk aesque hero through a great Mahlerian dirge of painful intensity—in D 
minor. Conversely, two decades later Britten depicts the mental collapse of 
Peter Grimes in a chilling passage of fragmented, unmetred snippets teetering 
on the edge of atonality, tenuously hanging on to a tonal base only through 
the ghostly presence of the dominant seventh pedal in the horns, which peer 
ominously through the fog underlying the distant chorus’s recurring “Grimes, 
Peter Grimes.” As a kind of corollary to these examples, it is important to note 
that Schoenberg’s dramatic, or programmatic, works, with their externally 
driven “meaning,” or psychological subtexts, have garnered comparatively 
greater public acceptance than his non-texted, or abstract, works.
Expressionism is an artistic movement that has as its philosophical parallel 
nihilism. In it lies a concentrated, almost barbaric, power, but also the seeds 
of madness. It is an art of pessimism, of anxiety and decay, of existentialist 
angst. It speaks to the spiritual exhaustion of a society. Atonality is its pri-
mary musical mirror. Writing in the early years of the First World War, the 
52 Anhalt to Rochberg, letter of 29 October 1998, Istvan Anhalt Fonds (MUS 164), Music Di-
vision, Library and Archives Canada. 
53 See Alan Gillmor, “Echoes of Time and the River,” in Taking a Stand: Essays in Honour of 
John Beckwith, ed. Timothy J. McGee (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995), 24. 
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Austrian playwright and critic Hermann Bahr provided a sinister defi nition of 
Expressionism: 
Never yet has any period been so shaken by horror, by such a fear of death. 
Never has the world been so silent, silent as the grave. Never has man 
been more insignifi cant. Never has he felt so nervous. Never was happi-
ness so unattainable and freedom so dead. Distress cries aloud; man cries 
out for his soul; this whole pregnant time is one great cry of anguish. Art 
too joins in, into the great darkness she too calls for help, she cries to the 
spirit: this is Expressionism.54
If we add to this Karl Kraus’s portentous observation that turn-of-the-cen-
tury Vienna was an “experimental station for the end of the world,”55 the pic-
ture becomes even more disturbing. Even a cursory survey of the works of the 
Second Viennese School reveals a marked similarity of extra-musical theme: 
psychological disorientation and deterioration, alienation and isolation, sexual 
pathology and libidinal fantasy. Like the haunted, staring eyes of a Schoenberg 
self-portrait, the expressionists peered into the abyss, into the depths of their 
own naked souls. For Th omas Harrison, the “content” of expressionist music 
is “form unhinged from all content whatsoever—forms of pure sound in its 
unmitigated and alien materiality.” If this music has any emotional purpose, 
he concludes, “it is certainly not solace, consolation, joy, or reassurance. It is 
something closer to the unsettled, inexplicable emotions of turmoil, agitation, 
and unease.”56 As Adorno would have it, loneliness had found its style: “In 
Schoenberg, everything is based upon that lonely subjectivity which withdraws 
into itself.”57 Paradoxically, at the same time that it dramatically widened the 
expressive range of music, atonality tended to narrow it by channelling it into 
a single “daemonic” space. Film music is an art form that, usually, allies music 
with dramatic situation quite directly. In this regard it is interesting to note 
that Leonard Rosenman’s score for Th e Cobweb (1955), which centres on the 
staff  and inmates of a psychiatric institution, has the distinction of being the 
fi rst serial fi lm score. “Rosenman employed this compositional style, as many 
later fi lm composers did,” notes Joseph N. Straus, “to express intense and oft en 
negative emotions”58 (emphasis added).
To be sure, there are serial works of a gentle lyricism—Dallapiccola’s Quad-
erno musicale di Annalibera, for example—and serial works of a playful na-
ture—certain movements of Schoenberg’s op. 25 Piano Suite, perhaps, but the 
fact still remains that the vast majority of listeners fi nd the absence of familiar 
signposts and cadential breathing spaces unsettling. In short, a century aft er 
54 Hermann Bahr, Expressionism, trans. R. T. Gribble (London: Henderson, 1925), 84.
55 Quoted in Robert S. Wistrich, Laboratory for World Destruction: Germans and Jews in Cen-
tral Europe (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 11.
56 Th omas Harrison, 1910: Th e Emancipation of Dissonance (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1996), 47.
57 Th eodor W. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. 
Blomster (New York: Seabury, 1973), 142.
58 Joseph N. Straus, “A Revisionist History of Twelve-Tone Serialism in American Music,” Jour-
nal of the Society for American Music 2, no. 3 (August 2008): 377.
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Schoenberg’s plunge into atonal waters, more than three-quarters of a century 
aft er his fi rst serial works, and more than a half century aft er his death, the 
jury, its seems obvious, is no longer out. It may be, of course, that most people, 
seduced by the anesthetizing vacuity of mass culture, do not want to confront 
the harsher truths that much contemporary art has explored and exposed.
Th e resurgence of interest in Rochberg’s music gives credence to Alexander 
Ringer’s strong endorsement and his declaration that the composer had already 
achieved (by 1965 in Music for the Magic Th eater) “that complete independence 
from the past which is given only to those who have so fully absorbed it that 
it has ceased to burden the present, showing instead the way to the future.”59 
Although Ringer’s claim—from our much later vantage point—now appears a 
bit infl ated and premature, only Rochberg’s harshest critics would deny that 
the composer did eventually shed the burden of the past, and few would deny 
that he deserves a special place in the annals of American music as one who did 
indeed show a way forward. Th is much seems self-evident.
Whatever the fate of Rochberg’s music might be, his passionate defence of 
his aesthetic position over more than four decades was a welcome challenge 
to entrenched academic orthodoxy that gave a new generation the permission 
to roam freely through the labyrinth that connects the present to the past, af-
fording us from time to time a glimpse of who we are, individually and col-
lectively. Back in the heyday of “academic” modernism, Rochberg saw that if 
high-culture music were to avoid a kind of cultural suicide, it was necessary to 
arrive at a renewed understanding of our relation to tradition, continuity, and 
memory: 
Continuity and tradition are the connecting links essential between gen-
erations that bind them together through the passage of time. Memory is 
the human root of tradition and its continuity, the mysterious neuro-bio-
logical capacity which makes the past a living force welded to the present. 
Memory is, in fact, the value-endowing power in all vital human endeavor. 
If memory fades, we lose the past, its meaning and anchoring wisdom.”60 
Although there is no evidence that Rochberg knew the works of Giovanni 
Boine, his remarks concerning continuity and tradition, memory and 
meaning, bring to mind one of the Italian writer’s aphorisms from his 
Frammenti of 1915: “For my life is not constructed on the basis of a project, 
piece by piece, like buildings made of stone, and I run toward no goal like 
a horse to the fi nish. I have no future for I have no past. Lacking memory, 
I even lack hope.61
59 Alexander Ringer, “Th e Music of George Rochberg,” Musical Quarterly 42, no. 4 (October 
1966): 426.
60 Quoted in Guy Freedman, “Metamorphosis of a 20th Century Composer,” Music Journal 34, 
no. 3 (March 1976): 38.
61 Quoted in Harrison, 1910, 75.
Intersections29-1.indd 47   12/09/09 2:07:29 PM    
48 Intersections
ABSTRACT
An exploration of George Rochberg’s much-publicized rejection of musical modern-
ism—in particular serialism—in the early 1960s. Th e paper will explore Rochberg’s 
conception of musical time and space, duration in music and its relationship to the 
roles of memory, identity, intuition, and perception in the shaping of human experi-
ence. It will explain his notion of the “metaphysical gap between human consciousness 
and cosmos,” which he derived in part from Wittgenstein’s proposition that ethical 
and aesthetic judgments lie outside the property of language. In Rochberg’s view, seri-
alism fails to provide an organic three-dimensional model of duration as experienced 
through the human perception of time: past (memory) and future (anticipation) be-
come confl ated into a continuous present, and the crucial balance between informa-
tion and redundancy has malfunctioned.
RÉSUMÉ
Une exploration du rejet bien connu, chez George Rochberg, du modernisme musi-
cal — plus particulièrement du sérialisme — au début des années 1960. Cet article 
examine la conception que Rochberg se faisait de l’espace et du temps musical, de la 
durée en musique et de ses rapports avec la mémoire, l’identité, l’intuition, ainsi que 
la perception dans le développement de l’expérience humaine. Il explique la notion 
d’« écart métaphysique entre la conscience humaine et le cosmos » que Rochberg fait 
en partie remonter à la proposition de Wittgenstein selon laquelle le jugement éthi-
que et esthétique résiderait en dehors des propriétés du langage. Selon Rochberg, le 
sérialisme ne parvient pas à fournir un modèle organique tridimensionnel de la durée 
qui correspondrait à celui qui provient de la perception humaine du temps : passé 
(mémoire) et futur (prévision) fusionnent en un présent continu, et l’équilibre décisif 
entre information et redondance se révèle défaillant. 
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